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1
INTRODUCTION
Neuroplasticity and the Mind
In the last twenty years, revolutions in the field of neuroscience have raised many
open questions for scientists and philosophers of mind alike, as primary
assumptions in the field regarding the immutability of neural and mental states have
proven to be incorrect. Previously, the field postulated that the adult brain was fixed
in two respects: in that no new neurons are born and the functions of brain
structures were thought to be determinate.1 Recent studies have shown that both of
these notions are mistaken, as will be discussed. Another overturned assumption in
the field has been the discovery that the brain not only changes throughout one’s
life, rather than ceasing with childhood, but that in addition an individual can
consciously participate in that change by cultivating various mental states.2 The
brain’s potential for modification is referred to as neuroplasticity.3 The idea of

1 The creation of new neurons is expressed by the term neurogenesis. The presence of neurogenesis
in adults has also challenged the notion that the human brain is comparable to a sophisticated
computer, as “it is difficult to accept the idea that new cells could come into a complicated circuit and
become part of it in a way that would not only not be disruptive but might be beneficial,” Fred Gage, a
neuroscientist at the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, remarked to the Dalai Lama at the twelfth
Mind and Life conference. See Sharon Begley, Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain: How a New Science
Reveals Our Extraordinary Potential to Transform Ourselves (New York: Random House, 2007), 52 and
6.
2

Ibid., xii.

3 Plasticity refers to “in an individual or population, the capacity for adaptation: a) through gene
changes (genetic plasticity) or b) through internal physiological modifications in response to changes
in environment (physiological plasticity).” See James N. Parker and Philip M. Parker, eds. Brain: A
Medical Dictionary, Bibliography, and Annotated Research Guide to Internet References (Icon Group
International Inc., 2004), 429. Brain systems are shaped by experience throughout life, although
some brain systems are more plastic than others. See Begley, 75.
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neuroplasticity is revolutionary; the fact that the mind can alter both the processes
and the very structure of the brain calls into question the predominant physicalist
interpretation of mind common in the field of neuroscience. Physicalism holds that
the mind is reducible to a fixed brain and mental processes are nothing other than
neural processes.4 However, such a reductionist view of mind is difficult to reconcile
with current research and the workings of volitional neuroplasticity, leaving current
models of mind in need of revision or outright rejection.
As research regarding the brain’s capacity to change continues to grow, there
has been increasing interest in the capabilities of meditation in altering the brain, as
meditation offers a sort of demonstration for the loftier abilities of neuroplasticity.5
Experienced contemplatives in the Buddhist tradition find themselves increasingly
in Western laboratories, where innovative research is being conducted to learn
about the voluntary ability of using mental apparatus to change the functioning of
the brain and the processes of the mind. Advanced contemplatives have
demonstrated extreme malleability of mind and the production of physical
manifestations of such mental practice, making them invaluable for study. Often
scholars conveniently dismiss the possibility that religion and science could have
any meaningful exchange, yet the research that will be discussed here illustrates

Physicalism actually refers to a much broader worldview and holds that the nature of reality is
physical or supervenes on or is necessitated by the physical. See the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu, under “Physicalism” at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism. In some discussion on philosophy of mind,
physicalism is used to refer to identity theory, suggesting mental states and properties are
neurological states and properties. This is how the term will be used in this study. However, the
physicalism argument predominant in the neurosciences comes to be modified, as will be discussed.
4

For a survey of scientific research on neuroplasticity and related research on meditation, see
Begley.
5
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how this dogma is quickly being moved to the pile of outmoded historical “givens” in
intellectual thought. While Buddhism and neuroscience continue to converse in a
variety of subfields, “of all the concepts in modern neuroscience, it is neuroplasticity
that has the greatest potential for meaningful interaction with Buddhism,” Richard
Davidson, the director of the Laboratory for Affective Neuroscience based at the
University of Wisconsin‐Madison, remarked to the Dalai Lama on one occasion.6
The production of meaningful exchange with Buddhism regarding
neuroplasticity primarily occurs in one of two domains. One is in the scientific
research itself, as experienced contemplatives act as the subjects of research
involving such things as the role of attention for neuroplastic efficacy. The second
domain is in philosophy of mind and the self. Contemporary western philosophy of
mind has a number of theories regarding the nature of mentality that can be
categorized under the more general divisions of monism, including physicalism
mentioned above that argues there are no fundamental divisions between the
mental and the physical, and dualism that asserts the existential independence of
mind and matter.7 In regards to the philosophical implications of neuroplasticity,
such as the ontological implication that mind exists, the metaphysical possibility of

6

Ibid., 11.

7 Dualism has referred to a variety of positions in the history of thought, however here dualism
refers to the doctrine regarding philosophy of mind that contrasts mind and body. Dualist thinkers
include Plato, Aristotle, René Descartes, and Karl Popper. Forms of dualism include psychophysical
parallelism, occasionalism, and property dualism. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism.
Monism includes not only the identity theory as noted above, but also the theories of behaviorism,
upheld by Ludwig Wittgenstein, and functionalism, developed by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor. See
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism.
The most common form of monism in contemporary western philosophy is identity‐theory
physicalism. Important thinkers include John Smart and Ullin Place.
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top‐down causality (i.e. mind‐to‐body causality), and the epistemological
consequences regarding observation/experience and knowledge of reality, these
theories have a number of open questions that reduces their explanatory power,
however pliancy of mind is a fundamental assumption in Buddhist philosophy,
giving rise to the contemplative tradition.8 As such, Buddhists have long been
utilizing mental potentiality through the development of many different techniques,
generalized as meditation. Surrounding practice is a philosophy of mind or
consciousness and the related philosophy of self that in many ways reflect current
neuroscientific research and in doing so, provides a theoretical model of which to
understand neuroplasticity and its implications, addressing a lacuna in Western
theories of mind.9
According to the Buddhist perspective, the implications of neuroplasticity for
philosophy of mind and the self are vast and answer a range of open questions in the
West, including: What characterizes mentality? What is the self? What is the
relationship between mind and body? How can experience be accounted for? What
are the processes and mechanisms of mental states? And how can the mind be

8 Throughout this work, I refer variously to top‐down causation, two‐way causation, and mind‐body
causation. Some scientists use the term ‘top‐down’ to refer to ‘higher’ biological processes affecting
‘lower’ processes. This is not how the term is used in this study, rather ‘top‐down’ is one term that
refers to ‘mind to body’ causation as it is commonly referred to in the sciences. All the above terms
are used to convey mental and physical interaction or causation initiated from one or the other
impacting the other or both.
9 It is important to be aware of the linguistic limitations. Just as in English, Buddhists also use many
terms that refer to the mental including the Tibetan terms sem (citta in Sanskrit), translated as
“mind;” namshe (vijnana in Sanskrit), “consciousness;” and yi (Sanskrit, manas), “mentality” or
“mental states.” The Tibetan word namshe, referring to consciousness has much broader applicability
than the English term, covering all conscious experiences in addition to what may be categorized as
“unconscious” in Western psychological and psychoanalytic theories. Also, the Tibetan word for
“mind,” sem refers to thought in addition to emotion. The term “mind” as used in this study refers to
the whole range of mental events.

4

studied scientifically? These questions are the main object of this study and the
answers, the contribution.
Method
In the past twenty years or so, the works of many amateurs, specialists from a
variety of disciplines, and enthusiasts of all sorts have explored various aspects of
Buddhism and Science. There are at least five common approaches. The first is the
study of Buddhism and Science undertaken by those in the humanities and social
sciences and includes the analysis of such scholars as Donald S. Lopez Jr., B. Alan
Wallace, and David L. McMahan. The second approach is the scientific or medical
study of Buddhist practice, such as meditation. Various scientists and doctors,
including Stephen LaBerge, Richard Davidson, and Jon Kabat‐Zinn, have undertaken
research in this field. The third approach is a synthesis of Buddhism (variously
defined) and scientific findings (variously enumerated) to produce scientific
theories. Those who have taken this approach include the religious, the secular, and
the scientific, in both popular and scholarly works with perspectives ranging from
apologists to critics. One example from the many available is The Quantum and the
Lotus, by Matthieu Ricard and Trinh Xuan Thuan, which explores parallels between
physics and Buddhist thought. Some within this domain even produce cooperative
works between contemplatives and scientists, such as the Mind and Life Institute
publications. 10 The fourth approach involves the works of modern Buddhists such
as the Dalai Lama, who present Buddhism and Science in terms of there own
For a list of publications from the Mind and Life Institute, see
http://mindandlife.org/books.pubs_section.html.
10
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understanding of the evolving living tradition. While the Dalai Lama consciously
reinterprets philosophy and practice to appropriate Buddhism to the modern
context, other contemplatives and scholars have taken this approach as well, yet
perhaps with little awareness of how they are contributing to the transformation of
the tradition in question by re‐presenting old ideas in novel ways in addition to
deemphasizing or ignoring incommensurable religious elements.
The fifth approach is a synthesis of the other four, combining scholarly
analysis of the emerging scientific theories of contemplatives along with the
scientific study of Buddhist practice and the dialogue that these domains create.
Horizons in Buddhist Psychology: Practice, Research, & Theory, edited by Maurits G.T.
Kwee, Kenneth J. Gergen and Fusako Koshikawa, reflects this methodology. This
approach involves granting the status of modern Buddhism as a tradition within its
own right and analyzes Buddhism and Science in accordance with this living
tradition. What modern Buddhism involves and what the referent ‘Buddhism’ of
Buddhism and Science is will be discussed in the next section. This work primarily
follows this fifth approach. In the spirit of modern Buddhism with its multifaceted
nature, I will avoid essentializing the various perspectives, however my aim is also
to convey the intellectual vigor of the dialogue between these various approaches
and hence to outline the interpretations that have surrounded Buddhist
involvement with neuroscience and to engage with the philosophical questions
raised.

6

I would also like to contribute to the growth of a sixth approach, which
involves the expansion of dialogue between Buddhist contemplatives and/or
scholars of Buddhist philosophy and western philosophers of science. I undertook
this research in part to add to the growing realization that a purely Eurocentric
approach to broad philosophical questions is imposing needless limitations. I am
certainly not qualified to assess the accuracy of the scientific research or adequately
present the philosophies of science in entirety, I write as a scholar of modern
Buddhist philosophy with an interest in the impact of science. However, philosophy
of science is an important element for meaningful research within this domain.
Neuroscience is interpreted almost exclusively by Western enlightenment
philosophy and an undeniable bias in the field often results in the condemnation of
Eastern philosophy before it is seriously considered. There are many open questions
in philosophy of neuroscience and mind and Buddhism has many ideas that will be
novel to western readers. I make no attempt to disguise my own partiality towards
and admiration of Buddhist thought; yet I also wish to convey the importance of
expanding dialogue between Buddhist contemplatives and western philosophers of
science at this time. This research explores some particular Buddhist encounters
with western science, yet it is not just a historical study of ideas, but I hope, a
contribution to the expansion of the modern philosophical and intellectual
imagination.
In view of the fact that this research is for a diverse audience of scholars,
philosophers, both east and west, and scientists, many readers are likely to be
unfamiliar with some aspect of this study. Therefore, I will present the reader with
7

many references and footnotes for clarification. Also included is a broad outline of
the Buddhist tradition and various elements of belief and practice. The main target
of this work though is the modern appropriation of Buddhism rather than the
religion within the Asian context. While I avoid asserting Buddhism is somehow
scientifically accurate, I do attempt to provide a theoretical model for interpreting
the neuroscience and address the philosophical issues raised. The model cannot be
found within any single Buddhist teaching; rather it is extrapolated from a variety of
sources that have contributed to the development of modern Buddhist philosophy.
Buddhist theory of neuroplasticity therefore is one presentation of how a modern
Buddhist philosopher might interpret the material. While this may seem a tenuous
compilation of variously identified ‘Buddhist’ elements, the analysis and
presentation of Buddhist philosophy reflects modern Buddhists’ own understanding
of their tradition, as will be discussed in the next section.
When Buddhism was first introduced to the West it was often interpreted in
terms of western expectations and assumptions. Presently, scholars have addressed
such issues and have greatly expanded our knowledge of the living tradition in Asia.
However, because the initial presentation of Buddhism to the West was often
wrought with misunderstanding, a counter intellectual trend emerged with a
marked tendency to almost exclusively analyze the modern tradition through a
narrow definition of ‘Buddhism,’ stripped of the orientalist and essentialist notions
that permeated earlier scholarship. Yet, every methodology has its limits and it is
important to recognize that modern Buddhism demands a new paradigm that can
account for a Buddhism outside the imposed boundaries applied to the religion by
8

this counter trend. The question ‘How Buddhist is this Buddhism?’ is often raised as
an objection to Buddhist appropriation to the modern world as if this form of the
tradition were somehow ‘inauthentic.’ While misunderstanding of the religion has
certainly occurred, so have adaptation, evolution, and rebirth as the result of both
consciously modernizing individuals and the adoption of the tradition by self‐
identified Buddhists, who may or may not be aware of their contribution. The
novelties of this form of Buddhism are not indicative of inauthenticity, but rather
the mark of a distinct tradition. In short, modern Buddhism should not be held up to
some “traditional” standard or to a preconceived definition of the religion, rather as
scholars and enthusiasts, we should embrace this form of Buddhism as part of the
greater cultural, intellectual, and spiritual trends of modernity.
The next section is devoted to exploring the problematic terms of Buddhism
and Science. Part of this counter intellectual trend is emphasis on the use of terms.
Obviously clarity is always a concern, however the focus has been on resisting the
generalization and simplification of Eastern traditions with the use of overarching
words such as ‘Buddhism,’ ‘tradition,’ ‘Eastern,’ and ‘Western.’ While it is important
to be aware of such issues which are vital to much scholarship, I, like Richard
Dawkins in The Blind Watchmaker, take the stand that words are our servants, not
our masters. 11 It is impossible to make any real progress if every term is
problematized. Nonetheless, the terms ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Science’ need to be explored
to define their usage by the modern Buddhist philosopher. Yet, once I have made
known how these words are to be utilized, I will then use them freely within the
11

See Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 4.

9

context I have mapped out. Modern Buddhism in part illustrates how the uses of
dichotomies such as ‘East and West’ and ‘tradition and modernity’ are becoming
increasingly ineffective. However, perhaps due to my own lack of imagination, I see
no way of completely avoiding their use. These terms are the finger pointing to the
moon, not the moon itself, but I hope meaning will be conveyed nonetheless.
Modern Buddhism and the ‘Buddhism’ of Buddhism and Science
Traditionally, Buddhism has not concerned itself with science, however over one
hundred years ago, the modern world began to influence Buddhism in a way that led
to unprecedented developments, influencing the religion ever since. This
engagement with the intellectual trends of modernity has led to the growth of a new
form of Buddhism, one branch of the long tradition’s evolution, referred to as
modern Buddhism. According to David McMahan, ‘modern Buddhism’ is:
An actual new form of Buddhism that is the result of a
process of modernization, westernization,
reinterpretation, image‐making, revitalization, and
reform that has been taking place not only in the West
but also in Asian countries for over a century.12
Western enthusiasts and modernizing Asians became the avenue of which
the Buddhist community penetrated the modern world. Modern intellectual trends,
such as scientific rationalism, were adopted and subsequently utilized as a means to
expand Buddhist relevance and applicability in a variety of modern contexts.

See David L. McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), 5.
12

10

Disenchanted westerners became important contributors to the development of
modern Buddhism as well. Modern individuals looked to eastern wisdom to address
social problems of the age, including religious pluralism, the increasing clash
between religion and science, modern warfare, and emerging environmental issues.
The meeting of Buddhism and modernity has occurred on many cultural,
intellectual, and historical fronts, the impact shaping how Buddhism would
modernize through time. Although traditional elements remain in this form of
Buddhism, many have been reinvented to mold to western inclinations, resulting in
the purge of mythological elements and “superstitious” ritual from the religion.
After such a fundamental transformation, Buddhism needed to emphasize other
aspects of the tradition to maintain vitality in the Buddhist world and at the same
time situate itself in the modern context. The consequences of such evolution have
included new philosophical interpretations of cosmology and psychology, vast
changes in ritual and other practice, with new speakers for the tradition, and an
emphasis on the intellectual trends, social implications, and the language of
modernity. ‘Modern Buddhism’ is not simply Buddhism in the modern period, but
specifically refers to forms of Buddhism that have “emerged out of an engagement
with the dominant cultural and intellectual forces of modernity.”13
Modern Buddhism has referred to multiple different forms of Buddhism that
have arisen from the engagement with the intellectual trends of the European
Enlightenment and their predecessors. The discourse on Buddhism and Science is
no different, in that it too has manifested itself in many different ways. “Buddhism”
13

Ibid., 6.
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has meant the Theravada tradition of Sri Lanka, the “esoteric Buddhism” of
Theosophy, the Zen of D. T. Suzuki, and the tantric Buddhism of Tibet, to name a few.
“Science” has referred to a range of things as well, including astronomy, physics,
modern cosmology, and neurobiology. The contemporary phase of Buddhism and
Science refers to that of Tibetan Buddhism and the cognitive sciences, including
neuroscience and psychology.
Since the 1990s Tibetan Buddhism has engaged with science to a
unparalleled degree in previous forms and phases of modern Buddhism and the
Dalai Lama has become the representative champion of the movement, greatly
contributing to the strengthening of relations. Since the development of the Mind
and Life Conferences and the subsequent Mind and Life Institute, creating,
expanding, and improving dialogue between Buddhism and Science, the Dalai Lama
never fails to emphasize the compatibility of the two. At the first Mind and Life
conference, where unprecedented dialogue between Buddhists and scientists was
making history, the Dalai Lama said, “It is my view that generally Buddhism, and
particularly Mahayana Buddhism, is very close to a scientific approach.”14 His
Holiness goes on to assert that the authority in both Buddhism and science can be
reduced to “reasoning” and “logic” and that the “basic Buddhist attitude” is “analysis

See Jeremy W. Hayward and Francisco J. Varela, eds. Gentle Bridges: Conversations with the Dalai
Lama on the Sciences of Mind (Boston: Shambhala, 2001), 31.
14
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and examination through reasoning.”15 Such sentiments are ubiquitous in the field
of Buddhism and Science and are expressed at all the Mind and Life conferences.16
Unlike the vast majority of previous forms of modern Buddhism, this
‘scientific Tibetan Buddhism’ has mostly steered free of apologist claims and
approaches its relationship with science in a whole new way. While previous
advocates of Buddhism and Science, and some contemporary ones, make tenuous
parallels between the popular science of the time and various schools of thought,
scientific Tibetan Buddhism does not look to make claims, but rather to establish
dialogue and produce meaningful exchange. Because of this, the works of such
Buddhists, primarily the Dalai Lama and his colleagues, inform this study. The Dalai
Lama’s intellectual integrity results in an impartial representation of the tradition at
large, making note of any variance from school to school. Thus, the Buddhist
perspective on neuroscientific issues explored in this study is extrapolated from
Tibetan thinkers exchange with western scientists in addition to shared doctrine in
Asian Buddhist thought, including that of India and Tibet.
As these thinkers are part of the modern Buddhist movement, there is less of
a focus on sectarian differences and more emphasis on the complementariness
between any given tenet of Buddhist thought and Science. One of the major
characteristics of contemporary modern Buddhism is its nonsectarian and inclusive
15

Ibid., 32.

16 See http://www.mindandLife.org/current.conf.html for an overview of meetings, conferences,
and events. Their vision as described on the institute’s website illustrates the equal standing of
Buddhism and Science: “To establish mutually respectful working collaboration and research
partnerships between modern science and Buddhism — two of the world's most fruitful traditions
for understanding the nature of reality and promoting human well‐being.” See
http://www.mindandLife.org/mission.org_section.html.
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nature. As this study is subsumed within the field of modern Buddhism, the
Buddhist perspective is accordingly and appropriately presented in a nonsectarian
manner as the modern Buddhist would. That is, the ‘Buddhist perspective’ draws
from all schools of thought, with specific tenets chosen for their relevance,
compatibility (for both comparing and contrasting), consistency, and their
complementariness with current science and the related philosophies. However,
when referring to “Buddhism” and traditional thought regarding philosophy of mind
and the self, I will be using it in the general sense of both ancient Indian and Tibetan
thought, as the schools associated share many primary assumptions and much
doctrine, yet major points of contention will of course be duly noted.
Naturally, there are many contradictions and complications that arise when
drawing together two systems of thought like Buddhism and Science. Scholars and
devotees alike have accounted for these inconsistencies in a number of ways
including arguing Buddhism has always been modern or scientific, dismissing
incompatibilities between Buddhist and scientific thought as irrelevant or at least
not central to the argument at hand, and understanding the Buddhist utilization of
science as a western‐styled “skillful means.”17 The emergence of all these different
models for understanding “Buddhism and Science” illustrate the significant impact
this dialogue has had, as both the scholar and devotee struggle with understanding
science’s place in the Buddhist world. Many scholars have addressed and attempted

Donald S. Lopez suggests just as Buddhism grew to include Vedic gods in India and kami in Japan,
in order for Buddhism to be successful in the West, perhaps the religion has grown to include the god
of Science in the pantheon as well. See Lopez, Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed (New
York: University for Chicago Press, 2008), 37.
17

14

to answer this question, some with an optimistic outlook,18 some with more
doubtful inclinations.19 Yet, despite how Buddhism has been modified to situate
itself in scientific dialogue, this is not indicative of meaninglessness. “Buddhism and
Science” is an important historical movement that continues to produce valuable
dialogue with many important implications.
After briefly discussing the Buddhist perspective on the mutability of mental
and physical processes, I will turn to the scientific research on meditation and
neuroplasticity. As the science will reveal the philosophical issues involved, I will
then discuss the open questions at length and provide a modern Buddhist analysis
and interpretation of neuroplasticity and its implications. I will conclude with a
suggestion of how the scientific study of mind might proceed and the ethical
implications of neuroplasticity from the Buddhist perspective. By focusing on such a
narrow topic within the field of Buddhism and Science, I hope to convey the limitless
possibilities for meaningful exchange.
The Buddhist Perspective: Mutability and Contemplative Techniques
The ultimate goal of the Buddhist tradition as presented by the Buddha in the Four
Noble Truths is to end suffering or unsatisfactoriness and rebirth by fulfilling the
human potential for enlightenment or nirvana. Living in accord with the Eight Fold

See B. Alan Wallace and Brian Hodel, Contemplative Science: Where Buddhism and Neuroscience
Converge (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). B. Alan Wallace is a known practitioner of
Buddhism, the founder of the Santa Barbra Institute for Consciousness Studies, and an active scholar
and supporter in the field of “Buddhism and Science.”
18

See Lopez. Lopez takes a tentative approach in viewing scientific study as accretion to the
Buddhist canon. While he sees the accretion model explanation as somewhat accurate, he is also
wary of this approach, as it reduces much of what we once understood to be “Buddhism.”
19
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Path cultivates wisdom, morality, and meditation, resulting in the eventual
transformation of body, speech, and mind and ultimately liberation. The Buddhist
contemplative tradition is based on the fundamental belief in the mutable nature of
human beings and implicit to this idea is a relationship between mind and body
enabling transformation.
The Buddhist contemplative tradition holds that by using mental faculties,
one improves the quality of the faculties, which pivots on the assumption put forth
in the Eight Fold Path, that mind, body, and behavior can be transformed.20 Crucial
to transformation is first level training in introspection, aimed at developing
attention and equanimity. Attention is the faculty that helps direct the mind (a
deliberate intention) to a chosen object among the variety experienced. Attention is
developed through (a) mindfulness—a faculty that keeps the mind tied to the object
by maintaining meta‐awareness of mental states and (b) introspective vigilance—a
faculty to discern whether distraction occurs and whether the vividness of the
mind’s focus has become lax. The second faculty crucial to introspection is
equanimity—not excessively introspecting whereby the object becomes distorted
and the mind is destabilized. Development of attention and equanimity will lead to
mental pliancy, in that the mind is easily serviceable and can be directed freely to
any object, known as the ‘tranquil abiding of the mind’ or śamatha, in Sanskrit.21

20 The mind’s capacity for transformation is discussed in many Buddhist texts. Some of the earlier
Mahayana works include the fourth century The Sublime Continuum, attributed to Maitreya and
Praise to the Ultimate Expanse, attributed to Nagarjuna. Dharmakirti, an important Tibetan
philosopher, also discusses transformation of mind.
21

Ibid., 153. Śamatha is known as shi ne in Tibetan.

16

Second level training is known as ‘insight’ (vipaśyanā) meditation, and works to
discern investigation and analysis while in tranquil abiding.22 It begins with
sharpness of inquiry and then maintaining focus on resultant insight as long as
possible.
There are other techniques as well including structured analysis that has
been developed to focus contemplative exploration and address the pitfalls to
fantasy and delusion.23 These faculties have been targeted by specific techniques in
order to induce transformation of mind. Unfortunately, the scientific study of the
causal power of mental states to modify brain condition was long neglected, for as
the late biologist Francisco Varela commented, “ It seems counterintuitive to
Western assumptions.” However, he goes on to make the compelling statement, “but
it is logically implicit in what science is saying today.”24

22 Vipaśyanā is known as lhak thong in Tibetan. Both śamatha and vipaśyanā are practiced in
Theravada and Mahayana traditions.

Ibid., 155. In Stages of Meditation, the 8th century Indian Buddhist master Kamalashila provides a
detailed account of how both śamatha and vipaśyanā may be systematically cultivated. A translation
and commentary of this work by the Dalai Lama is available. See Stages of Meditation (Snow Lion
Publications: 2003).
23

See Begley, 133. Varela was highly accomplished in the neuroscientific and cognitive scientific
fields with over 150 publications. As a side note, the idea that the mind can be reduced to the brain
began in the seventeenth century when Rene Descartes declared the dualism between mind and
matter to be a scientific principle. Later, those known as the Oxford Circle, led by Thomas Willis, the
father of modern neurology, conducted the first scientific exploration of the brain and the nervous
system. With these studies began the trend of thinking about the mind in reductionist terms, in that
all mental and emotional states came to be considered as manifestations of brain processes. As
philosopher Colin McGinn put it “there is nothing more to a conscious state than its neural correlate”
(quoted in ibid., 135). By the 1990’s neuroscientists had identified what they called the explanatory
gap in how brain properties add up to mentality. Some iconoclasts began to understand the mind as
an emergent property of brain functions, so that the mind can affect the lower‐order processes from
which it came from, as will be discussed later. While the mainstream held that mental states could
only affect mental states because they were in fact brain states, some important scientists, including
Nobel Prize‐winning neuroscientist Roger Sperry, stayed firm with the claim that the interaction
24
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2
THE SCIENCE
Mental Faculties Conducive to Neuroplasticity
After two‐way causation had been implicated by some initial research on
neuroplasticity, scientists quickly took up the challenge to determine the causal
power of mental states. In one study, Harvard’s neurophysiologist Alavaro Pascual‐
Leone showed that thoughts of playing the piano altered the brain in the same way
as those who actually practiced playing. Mental practice resulted in the same
physical expansion of the motor cortex and resulted in similar reorganization of the
brain.25 This study shows that internal, mental stimuli, such as thoughts and
concentration, can change the brain. As studies continued throughout the 1990’s, it
became increasingly apparent that the degree of attention was directly related to
the magnitude of neuroplastic efficacy. In other words, attention was found to be
vital and necessary if neuroplasticity is to come to fruition.26 This reflects the
Buddhist approach, as focused attention is the foundation for more advanced mental
training. As Davidson notes, “attentional training is so important in Buddhism, and it

between the mental and physical was not unidirectional. As history was soon to tell, this seems to in
fact be the case.
Noted in ibid., 152. See A. Pascual‐Leone, A. Amedi, F. Fregni, and L. B. Merabet, “The Plastic
Human Brain Cortex,” Annual Reviews of Neuroscience 28 (2005): 380.
25

For example, see G. H. Recanzone, C. E. Schreiner, and M. M. Merzenich, “Plasticity in the
Frequency Representation of Primary Auditory Cortex Following Discrimination Training in Adult
Owl Monkeys,” Journal of Neuroscience 13 (1993): 87‐103.
26
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also is recognized to be very important by scientists. In many ways, attentional
training can be thought of as the gateway to plasticity.”27
Meditation and Neuroscience
Buddhism and neuroscience agree particular mental states, such as attention, enable
the malleability or plasticity of the mind. However, attention alone will not produce
change, rather specific meditative techniques are needed to achieve the desired
effect. The selection of Buddhist meditation for the neuroscientific exploration of
techniques for harnessing the power of neuroplasticity was not an arbitrary one. In
the Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, the reason for this choice is described as
follows: “unlike many contemplative traditions, Buddhist traditions tend to offer
extensive, precisely descriptive, and highly detailed theories about their practices in
a manner that lends itself readily to appropriation into a neuroscientific context.”28

27

Begley, 160.

See A. Lutz, J. D. Dunne, and R. J. Davidson, “Meditation and the Neuroscience of Consciousness:
An Introduction” in The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 503. This is not to say the ambiguity of the term is not a matter of concern for scientists.
Much to the contrary, those involved in such study continue to look for meaningful ways of
describing Buddhist practice. However, because the questions asked vary greatly from that of social
scientists, the parameters for a definition of meditation are therefore quite different. What is defined
is what can be observed objectively. So, while meditative techniques and the states induced are
acceptable terms of defining meditation because of their measurable neural correlates, the
meditative reflection on ultimate reality and other such philosophical components are separated as
unverifiable. Davidson remarked, “The value of consulting a specific tradition is precisely that –
through accident or expertise – the tradition may have gleaned some valuable knowledge or
developed some practice that is not found elsewhere.” Focusing on a specific tradition allows
scientists to explore the particular psychology and epistemology associated with it, in addition to the
meditation techniques, and then from these tenets derive what contributions Buddhism can offer to
the neurosciences in terms of understanding the cognitive and affective processes that are altered by
mental training. There is another reason that neuroscientists see value in studying Buddhist
techniques, it is simply that Buddhist understanding “is strongly consistent with our knowledge of
the neurosciences.” See 499‐502 for an excellent review of issues in the study of meditation and how
the claims and descriptions resulting from such study are being sorted out by neuroscientists,
making research increasingly sophisticated and meaningful.
28
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While there have been over 1,000 empirical studies done on meditation, the
neurophysiological processes involved and the effects of long‐term mental training
remain largely unknown.29 Part of the problem with such studies has been the use of
the term meditation, as it has referred to numerous types of practice. Today,
however, cognitive scientists are much more aware of this problem and focus on
specific types of Buddhist meditation in the hopes that it may reveal some clear
effects of mental practice.30
While the types of Buddhist meditation are numerous, those under rigorous
and critical investigation can be categorized into three broad divisions: śamatha,
also known as object meditation, cultivates tranquility and concentration;
vipaśyanā, sometimes called mindfulness, provides insight and wisdom; and maitrī,
29 Ibid., 499‐500. For a complete survey of the empirical literature on meditation see J. H. Austin,
Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1998); R. Cahn and J. Polich, “Meditation States and Traits: EEG, ERP, and Neuroimaging Studies,” in
Psychological Bulletin 132 (2006): 180‐211; M. M. Delmonte, “Electrocortical Activity and Related
Phenomena Associated with Meditation Practice: A Literature Review,” in International Journal of
Neuroscience 24 (1984): 217‐231; Delmonte, “Biochemical Indices Associated with Meditation
Practice: A Literature Review,” in Neuroscience & Biobehavioural Reviews 9.4 (1985): 557‐561; P. B.
Fenwick, “Meditation and the EEG,” in The Psychology of Meditation, edited by A. West (New York:
Clarendon Press, 1987), 104‐117; D. S. Holmes, “Meditation and Somatic Arousal Reduction: A
Review of the Experimental Evidence” in American Psychologist 39 (1984), 1‐10; and R. R. Pagano
and S. Warrenburg, “Meditation: In Search of a Unique Effect” in Consciousness and SelfRegulation
(Vol. 3), edited by R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwartz, and D. Shapiro (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), 152‐
210. A theoretical model involving the neurophysiological processes involved in the transformation
of mind brought about by meditation will be explored at a later point.

Neuroscientists, of course, have very specific and sophisticated ways of defining meditation so
that it may be objectively studied. Meditation is defined in four ways. First, a form of meditation is
described according to the predictable and distinctive state associated with it, indicated by specific
cognitive and/or physical phenomenon that can be observed and repeated. Second, the predictable
and lasting traits and/or effects on both mind and body induced by repeated practice are used to
distinguish one form from another. The third way meditation is understood is by the increasing
levels of change from novice to adept, where improvement is observable by the acquisition of certain
cognitive, emotional, and/or physical traits or by the occurrence of certain cognitive, emotional, or
physical events. Fourth, is that the induction of meditative states must be something that can be
learned, otherwise claims of a relationship between the production of meditative states and the
development of certain traits becomes irrelevant. See Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson, 502‐503 and 510‐
518 for a discussion on how meditation terminology is being used in scientific studies.
30
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or compassion meditation, develops loving‐kindness.31 The Buddhist scholar
understands that these categories are vague and somewhat arbitrary, as śamatha
and vipaśyanā describe two aspects of the same meditative state and are not so
easily separated. Furthermore, when scientists study meditation techniques they
often look at one type that falls under one of these three categories. 32 For the sake
of simplicity, the scientific research discussed has been divided into just the two
categories of mindfulness meditation and compassion meditation.
Mindfulness Meditation and Neuroscience
Mindfulness meditation is increasingly being used in secular environments to treat a
range of mental pathologies, including stress, depression, and obsessive‐compulsive
disorder (OCD). In a study conducted by neuropsychiatrist Jeffrey Schwartz and
colleague Lewis Baxter, patients suffering from OCD who went through
mindfulness‐based therapy showed a dramatic decrease in activity in the orbital
frontal cortex, the area activated by the disorder, compared to control subjects. As
Schwartz noted:
[The study] offered strong evidence that willful, mindful
effort can alter brain function, and that such self‐
directed brain changes—neuroplasticity—are a genuine

31 These are the Sanskrit terms. See Dakpo Tashi Namgyal, Mahāmudrā: The
Moonlight―Quintessence of Mind and Meditation (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2006) for a detailed
description of different forms of meditation. Maitrī is also practiced in both Theravada and Mahayana
Buddhism. In addition to these broad categories of meditation, Tibetan Buddhism also has thousands
of tantric visualizations.
32 For example, “focused attention” meditation, Tsécig Tingngédzin, occurs in many forms of
practice, but is generally understood as śamatha.

21

reality. Mental action can alter the brain chemistry of an
OCD patient. The mind can change the brain.33
In another example, psychologist Zindel Segal and Cambridge’s John Teasdale
and Mark Williams developed what they called mindfulness‐based cognitive therapy
for the treatment of depression. While patients under usual treatment served as the
control group with 34 percent free of relapse, of those under mindfulness‐based
cognitive therapy, the rate increased to 66 percent. That comes out to be a 44
percent reduction in the relapse rate among those involved in mindfulness therapy,
as reported in 2000.34 In 2004, Teasdale, along with colleague Helen Ma, replicated
the study, finding the same results of reduced relapse. By drawing awareness to
their own mental states, patients suffering from depression were able to keep their
negative thoughts from resulting in relapse.35 These findings indicate top‐down
plasticity, because transformation originates in cognitive activity, that is, the mind
initiates changes in the brain.
Mindfulness meditation has also found itself in the treatment of stress. In
1995, Jon Kabat‐Zinn developed a program called the Center for Mindfulness in
Medicine, Health Care, and Society as an outgrowth of the acclaimed Stress
Begley, 141. Schwartz’s studies of OCD and mindfulness‐based therapy are discussed at length in
J. M. Schwartz and S. Begley, The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force
(New York: Regan Books, 2002), chapter 2, “Brain Lock.”
33

See J. Scott, J. D. Teasdale, E. S. Paykel, A. L. Johnson, R. Abbott, H. Hayhurst, R. Moore, and A.
Garland, “Effects of Cognitive Therapy on Psychological Symptoms and Social Functioning in Residual
Depression,” British Journal of Psychiatry 177 (2000): 440‐46; and J. D. Teasdale, Z. V. Segal, J. M.
Williams, V. A. Ridgeway, J. M. Soulsby, and M. A. Lau, “Prevention of Relapse/Recurrence in Major
Depression by Mindfulness‐Based Cognitive Therapy,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychiatry 68
(2000): 615‐23.
34

See S. H. Ma and J. D. Teasdale, “Mindfulness‐Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression:
Replication and Exploration of Differential Relapse Prevention Effects,” Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychiatry 72 (2004): 31‐40.
35
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Reduction Center, established in 1979 at the University of Massachusetts Medical
School.36 Mindfulness‐based therapy has been found to produce alterations in
patterns of prefrontal brain activity that has previously been found to accompany a
positive affect.37 Courses on Mindfulness‐Based Stress Reduction now extend
beyond the hospital setting for chronic patients and are applied to a wide array of
individuals.38 This method, with a primary basis in Buddhist practice, is now being
used to treat chronic pain, anxiety disorders, general psychological well‐being,
psoriasis, and recurrent depression.39 Recent studies have revealed that this type of
therapy also produces changes in brain structure, showing again that meditation
can induce neuroplasticity.40
Compassion Meditation and Neuroscience
In the 1980’s some initial studies on the plasticity of baseline emotions revealed a
connection between attachment security and compassion.41 Attachment security is

For more information, see http://www.umassmed.edu. Kabat‐Zinn is also a founding Fellow of
the Fetzer Institute that aims at the utilization of love, forgiveness, and compassion in transforming
individuals and communities. See http://www.fetzer.org.
36

37 See R. J. Davidson, J. Kabat‐Zinn, J. Schumacher, M. Rosenkranz, M. Muller, D. Santorelli, S. F.
Urbanowski, A. Harrington, K. Bonus, and J. F. Sheridan, “Alterations in Brain and Immune Function
Produced by Mindfulness Meditation,” Psychosomatic Medicine 65.4 (2003): 564‐570.
38 See J. Kabat‐Zinn and A. Chapman‐Waldrop, “Compliance with an Outpatient Stress Reduction
Program: Rates and Predictors of Program Completion,” Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 11.4 (1988):
333‐353; and Kabat‐Zinn, Lipworth, and Burney, “The Clinical Use of Mindfulness Meditation for the
Self‐Regulation of Chronic Pain,” Journal of Behavioral Medicine 8.2 (1985): 163‐90.

See P. Grossman, L. Niemann, S. Schmidt, and H. Walach, “Mindfulness‐Based Stress Reduction
and Health Benefits: A Meta Analysis,” Journal of Psychosomatic Research 57.1 (2004): 35‐43.
39

See S. Lazar, G. Bush, R. L. Gollub, G. L. Fricchione, G. Khalsa, and H. Benson, “Meditation
Experience is Associated with Increased Cortical Thickness,” Neuroreport 16.17 (2005): 1893‐7.
40

41

Begley, 197‐8.
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the degree of which one feels secure in his/her own personal relationships and
those who had a high degree of attachment security also had higher degrees of
compassion. After a series of studies, Phillip Shaver and Mario Mikulincer of Bar Ilan
University in Israel, found that the circuitry for attachment security is plastic and
therefore can be increased along with compassion, thereby decreasing selfishness
and ethnocentrism.42
These findings launched further studies in developing positive mental states
that would take advantage of the possibilities of neuroplasticity. Richard Davidson,
who is familiar with Buddhist meditation and its implications for transforming
emotions, undertook a study to examine the relationship between mental training
and the generation of enduring happiness and other positive emotions. His
hypothesis was that meditation has the ability to change the brain, through the
workings of neuroplasticity, where patterns of neural activity or even the structure
of neurons can be altered. Tibetan Buddhists monks traveled to the United States at
the Dalai Lama’s encouragement to act as subjects of research aimed at detecting
change in patterns of prefrontal activation, the physical location correlated to
positive emotions, through the process of mental training.43 The monks followed the
scientists’ instructions in alternating neutral mental activity with six mental states,
including compassion meditation. During compassion meditation, the left frontal

42 Mikulincer and Shaver describe their work in numerous publications. See Mikulincer, T. Dolev,
and Shaver, “Attachment‐Related Strategies during Thought Suppression: Ironic Rebounds and
Vulnerable Self‐Representations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89 (Nov. 2005): 817‐
39, for an extensive overview.
43 EEG is the acronym for electroencephalography and is a tool for measuring the electrical activity
between neurons firing across the brain.
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cortex, and the neural correlate for happiness, was higher than 99.7 percent of
everyone ever measured.44
After listening to a report of the findings, the Dalai Lama makes the
compelling remark that happiness is something that can be cultivated deliberately.45
Davidson makes a similar conclusion, stating happiness is not simply a state or a
trait, but a skill, one that can be enhanced through mental training, just as Buddhism
suggests. Davidson says:
There is a tremendous lacuna in our worldview, where
training is seen as important for strength, for physical
agility for athletic ability, for musical ability—for
everything except emotions. The Buddhists say these
are skills, too, and are trainable like any others.46
Whereas emotions had been previously thought to be localized in certain
areas of the brain, studies began to reveal that every area of brain dedicated to
emotion is also devoted to some aspect of thought; both emotion and cognitive
processing share the same neural circuits.47 This neuroanatomy is consistent with
the Buddhist notion that thoughts and emotions are inseparable parts of the same
mental event and only further the hypothesis that cognition, with mental training,
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Begley, 229.

Ibid. For more information regarding Buddhist and scientific understandings of emotions, see
Paul Ekman, Richard J. Davidson, Matthieu Ricard, and B. Alan Wallace, “Buddhist and Psychological
Perspectives on Emotions and Well‐Being,” in Current Directions in Psychological Science 14.2 (2005),
59‐63.
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Begley, 231.
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Ibid., 232.
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can alter the circuitry of emotions.48 Davidson continued to investigate the
possibilities of emotional plasticity. Using an fMRI to measure activity in the
amygdala, the area of the brain associated with emotions such as distress, fear,
anger, and anxiety, he found that simply by having the aspiration that a person in a
photo be free of suffering, subjects, even without mental training, can alter
activation in the brain.49 Thought was altering emotion.
In another experiment, Davidson tested eight Buddhist adepts along with
eight non‐meditators as controls, to engage in loving‐kindness meditation while
their brain waves were measured by EEGs. The prominent presence of gamma
waves was noticed at once, the signal continuing to rise over the meditation period.
Gamma waves are believed to generally be associated with mental effort in addition
to being the signature for activity between widespread brain circuitry and seem to
be related to consciousness and perception. Even during neutral mental activity, the
monks’ increase in gamma waves was larger than had ever been recorded in
previous neuroscience experimentation. 50 Furthermore, Davidson found a linear
relationship between the number of years practiced and their baseline gamma
signal, showing that the degree of mental training is related to the degree of
change.51 The study was the first study on compassion meditation ever conducted

48 Buddhist notions of cognitive‐emotional processing, designated by the unit vithi in the
Abhidharma, will be discussed at a later point.
49

Ibid., 232‐3.
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Ibid., 234.

51

Ibid., 236.
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and was soon published in the prestigious science journal Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences.52
The results also showed that even when not mediating the adepts’ brain
signals were significantly different than non‐meditators, illustrating that meditation
or mental training can manifest as an enduring brain trait. Buddhists do not find this
surprising, as it supports the claim that meditation has significant and lasting effects
beyond the actual period of practice, influencing the person on a fundamental level
that changes everyday life. Of even greater significance to Buddhists is the regions of
the brain that were shown to be active during compassion meditation, as the
physical correlates of the practice reflect what this type of meditation is meant to
cultivate. During meditation, the brains of experienced meditators and the control
subjects alike both showed activity in areas related to monitoring emotions,
planning movements, and positive emotions such as happiness. For the adepts,
however, there was increased activation in the right insula and caudate, the network
associated with empathy and maternal love and that is exactly the desired effect of
this type of meditation. The amount of hours spent in meditation was again
informative of the degree of activation in these areas. And because of this increased
activation in the area of the brain related to planned movement, it seemed as if the
monks held the intent to act on this compassion. As Davidson noted at the twelfth

See A. Lutz, L. L. Greischar, N. B. Rawlings, M. Ricard, and R. J. Davidson, “Long‐Term Meditators
Self‐Induce High‐Amplitude Gamma Synchrony during Mental Practice,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 101 (Nov. 16, 2004): 16369‐73.
52
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Mind and Life conference, these results seemed to give real meaning to the phrase
‘moved by compassion.’53
Another consistency between Buddhism and science revealed by such
studies is that the meditating monks showed activation in networks associated with
pain and, as Davidson notes, shows the notion of ‘suffering with’ someone makes
real sense neurologically.54 As part of compassion meditation involves the
‘ingestion’ of others’ suffering, this makes sense to Buddhists as well.55 Furthermore,
regions that are involved in the understanding of what is “self” and what is “other”
showed reduced activity, in adepts and novices alike.56 The Buddhist scholar can
immediately see how these studies are so compelling in the study of Buddhist
philosophy. As all meditation is ultimately orientated toward realizing the wisdom
of emptiness and no‐self, physical evidence of meditation quieting the notion of
“self” is quite compelling. The concept of no‐self will be discussed at a later point.
Such activity of the brain is notably higher in experienced meditators, suggesting
again that the cultivation of these positive skills can be trained.
Of course, these results are of great interest to the neuroscientific community
as well, for, as Davidson says:
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Begley, 238.
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Ibid., 238.

In Tibetan this practice is called tonglen and involves sending out your happiness and
compassion to all sentient beings with the exhalation of breath, proceeded by the inhalation of all
others’ pain and suffering.
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Because increased training in compassion meditation
results in greater activation of areas linked to love and
empathy, it suggest that emotions might be transformed
by mental training. Science has long held that emotional
regulation and emotional response are static abilities
that don’t much change once you reach adulthood. But
our findings clearly indicate that mediation can change
the function of the brain in an enduring way.57

57

Ibid., 238‐9.
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3
PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH
As the research has revealed not only consistencies between Buddhism and
neuroscience, but also some quite compelling possibilities, it seems the implications
of the findings for philosophy of mind deserves some attention. Buddhism has long
considered the potential of the plastic mind, which has been subject to intense
analysis by serious contemplatives. The resultant Buddhist model of mind is an
alternate vision that has not been fully considered by western philosophers, one
that addresses the difficulties and pitfalls associated with current, predominantly
accepted models in the field, including physicalism and dualism.58
The Middle Way between Physicalism and Dualism
Regarding the structure of reality, Buddhism rejects both physicalism and dualism,
instead taking the middle way between the two. Buddhism suggests there are three
fundamental aspects of the mundane world of conditioned things, the world of
conventional experience: (1) matter—physical objects; (2) mind—subjective
experience; and (3) abstract composites—mental formations. Science deals
primarily with that which is physical, observable, and objectifiable and often
maintains the metaphysical assumption that all reality is ultimately reducible to
such, including the mind. Many philosophers of neuroscience maintain similar
58 This is a vast oversimplification of the sophisticated arguments put forth by many important
thinkers. Yet, reducing the philosophical viewpoints to this dichotomy will help illustrate the
Buddhist understanding by comparison. For a comprehensive overview of past and present
contributions in philosophy of mind, see David J. Chalmers, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
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views. According to the Buddhist perspective, the mental realm is heavily contingent
upon physical bases, however it is also considered separate from the material world.
In other words, the mental cannot be reduced to the physical, although it may
depend upon the physical to function.59 At first glance this may appear to be
dualistic, however this in fact is not the case, as will be discussed shortly. The third
realm of abstract composites cannot be characterized as physical or mental because
it is not composed of material constituents nor does it exist only in subjective
experience. These include features of reality that are integral to our understanding
of the world, including time, concepts, and logical principles that are essentially
constructs of our mind but distinct from the typology of mental phenomena. All
phenomena within this realm are contingent upon either the physical or mental
realms but have characteristics distinct from the two.60
Buddhist philosophy further divides the mental realm into a six‐fold typology
of mental phenomena: the experiences of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and the
mental states. 61 Mental phenomena corresponding to the five senses are considered

59 With the exception of one materialist school in India, most ancient Indian and Tibetan
philosophical schools agree that the mental cannot be reducible to the physical. See His Holiness the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama [Tenzin Gyatso], The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science
and Spirituality (New York: Broadway Books, 2005), 126.

This is similar to philosopher of science Karl Popper’s vision of reality. See “Three Worlds,” the
Tanner Lecture on Human Values delivered at the University of Michigan, April 7th, 1978. Accessible
at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/popper80.pdf.
60

One division of the Yogacara school posits an eightfold typology. In addition to the six discussed,
they argue for the existence of a ‘basic mind’ that retains throughout the lifetime of an individual and
is best understood as ‘foundational consciousness.’ Inextricable from this foundational consciousness
is the consciousness of selfhood, asserting “I am.” This is understood as a distinct stream of
consciousness. The Middle Way school, generally upheld by Tibetan thinkers, rejects this typology
because of the potential implications of foundational consciousness regarding the nature of self. See
the Dalai Lama (2005), 123‐124.
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contingent upon the sensory faculties that are understood as material (i.e. physical).
The experience of mental states on the other hand, have greater independence from
their physical bases as faculties such as imagination illustrate. There are two
primary characteristics that define these various states as mental: luminosity and
knowing.62 Luminosity or clarity refers to the ability of mental states to reveal or
reflect. Knowing or cognizance refers to mental state’s faculty to perceive or
apprehend what appears. All phenomena having these qualities are regarded as
mental. The Dalai Lama provides further elucidation:
Just as in light there is no categorical distinction
between the illumination and that which illuminates, so
in consciousness [i.e. mental states] there is no real
difference between the process of knowing or cognition
and that which cognizes. In consciousness, as in light,
there is a quality of illumination.63
Mentality is not considered to be distinct from these mental processes; rather the
mind is characterized as such.
As physicalism holds that mental processes are nothing other than physical
processes, categorizing the mind as mental processes may seem to suggest the
mental is simply physical, evidenced by neural correlates of mental events.
However, the primary characteristic of mind is its subjective nature and nothing
purely objective can fully account for subjectivity. It is by nature different than the
physical, objective world. Because the nature of the mental and physical are
necessarily different one cannot be the substantial cause of the other. This is
Young Tibetan Buddhists’ first lesson in epistemology is, “The definition of the mental is that
which is luminous and knowing.” Ibid., 124.
62

63

Ibid., 125.
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because according to Buddhist theory of causation there are two principle
categories of causes: (1) the substantial cause, the substance that turns in to a
particular effect (for example, clay is the substantial cause of a pot); and (2)
contributory or complementary causes, that is all other factors that make the effect
possible (continuing the previous example, this would include such things as the
potter and kiln).64 According to Buddhist theory of consciousness, consciousness
and matter can and do contribute toward the origination of each other, but one can
never be the substantial cause of the other. 65 Furthermore, if this is the line of
demarcation between the mental and the physical than subjective experience having
neural correlates does not refute the claim that one’s mind, one’s subjective
experience can alter the physical. In fact, the neural correlates can be interpreted as
supporting such a theory, as they provide the mechanism of which the mental can
act on the physical.
Dualism suggests there are two independent substances, mind and matter.
This is not the Buddhist view. Instead, reality as experienced by ordinary perception
is the world of conditioned things. The nature of reality contains two truths, the
conventional and the ultimate. They are distinct and neither is more “true” than the
other. On the ultimate level, nothing has inherent existence and is known as
“empty,” rather everything is dependently originated, that is everything originates
according to causes and conditions and is therefore subject to change. All things
It is perhaps worth noting the substantial and contributory causes are comparable to Aristotle’s
material and efficient causes.
64

Ibid., 131. Buddhist theory of causation has been explored by thinkers such as Dharmakirti (ca.
cent.). His philosophy is generally upheld by Tibetan thinkers and is part of the monastic
curriculum.
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experienced in the conditioned world go through the three phases of arising,
remaining, and ceasing. The mind, like all conditioned phenomena, arises from
many contributing factors and is dependent on and relational to many components.
Mind and body are distinct, but not wholly separate, related, but not equivalent.
Both physicalism and dualism have difficulty accounting for two‐way
causation implicated by neuroplasticity. The philosophy of physicalism is
complicated by recent research showing the production of physical change through
attention and other volitional mental states (such as equanimity), which would be
impossible according to the prevalent view in neuroscience that rejects mental
causation. Two‐way causality is a problem for dualism in that if mind and matter are
completely existentially independent from each other, how could any kind of causal
relationship between the two be accounted for? Just as it is difficult to accept that
mind and matter are reducibly equivalent, positing the mental and the physical are
wholly independent is equally unsatisfactory. Rather, the middle way between the
two, positing distinction, but not total separation between mind and body seems to
be consistent with the neuroscientific research and the implications of
neuroplasticity. 66
The Neuroplastic Mind, TwoWay Causation, and the Problem of Self

B. Alan Wallace has also acknowledged the Buddhist view as the “Middle Path between Dualism
and Materialism.” See Houshmand, et al., 34‐37.
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Buddhists see neuroplasticity as an expression of the fluidity and impermanence of
mental states in the ever‐changing processes that characterize consciousness.67 This
idea is of fundamental importance to Buddhism, in that neuroplasticity can be
equated to mental transience and attaining understanding of the nature of mind is
the foundation of the Buddhist notion of no‐self, to be discussed shortly.
Neuroplasticity suggests the mind is not, in fact, some automated, mechanical
process emerging from the physical, but is distinct and enjoys some independence
from the brain, reflecting Buddhist understanding.68 Even though the mind is
considered to be distinct from the brain, this is not seen as establishing any kind of
permanent or inherent existence. Rather, the mind is characterized by the transitory
processes of consciousness or neuroplastic potential and, therefore, has no
permanent attributes that could account for inherent existence. The Madhymika or
Centrist view of Tibetan Buddhism rejects the inherent existence of all things.
However, things do exist in relation to each other, including the mental and the
physical related through sensation, perception, and conception. This school of
thought rejects both the philosophies of dualism and physicalism as noted above.
Phenomena do not exist in themselves, but do exist as dependently related events.
67 His Holiness the Dalai Lama explicitly expresses this view. See the Dalai Lama (2005), 150. There
are many varieties of awareness and degrees and qualities of consciousness falling along a spectrum
from the very gross to the very subtle. Those that are of a grosser nature are entirely dependent on
the physical body as discussed earlier, however subtle levels of consciousness are related to
conceptual awareness (as oppose to sensory awareness). For a brief discussion on the spectrum on
consciousness between His Holiness and western scientists, see Zara Houshmand, Robert B.
Livingston, and B. Alan Wallace, eds. Consciousness at the Crossroads: Conversations with the Dalai
Lama on Brain Science and Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1999, 37‐55.
68 Buddhism concedes that the brain or the body is the basis for certain kinds of awareness, but the
brain is not understood as apprehending anything at all. The awareness apprehends, not the physical
body. See Daniel Goleman, ed. Healing Emotions: Conversations with the Dalia Lama on Mindfulness,
Emotions, and Health. Boston: Shambhala, 1997, 232.
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Dependence is threefold: (1) things arise in dependence on preceding causal
influences, (2) phenomena exist in dependence on their own attributes, and (3) they
are dependent on humankind’s verbal and conceptual designation of them. 69 The
mind too, exists as a causal nexus, part of which is shared with the body, allowing
for two‐way causation.70
In light of the implications of neuroplasticity regarding mind‐body causality,
both physicalists and dualists need to modify some of their claims about the mind‐
body relationship. While this is still a major problem that needs to be addressed in
dualism, advocates of physicalism have put forth a revised argument, positing the
mind is an ‘emergent property’ of the brain, which has become the predominant
theory in neuroscience. The idea that the mind is a property of the brain is a
philosophically tricky explanation that finds a way to recognize the mind and
dismiss it at the same time and attempts to support the two contradictory notions
that mind has existence but is without subsistence. This explanation allows for the
continuation of the reductionist, physicalist view by denying the mind any
categorical distinction from the brain. Buddhists and neuroscientists agree that
consciousness is a process; however, if the mind is a process it necessitates a cause
69

See Houshmand, et al., 35.

Some philosophers of science argue for an etiological understanding of explanations, that is
explanation should describe cause and effect in terms of a shared causal nexus between supporting
component parts, rather than a constitutive explanation of component parts that understands cause
and effect in reductionist terms. For example, see Wesley C. Salmon, Causality and Explanation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), which brings together this important thinker’s contributions
over the course of his career. Buddhist understanding of dependent origination can be compared to
the etiological explanation position, in that cause and effect do not occur solely as the
mechanical/physical reaction of component parts, but also occur as a causal nexus. A good
explanation therefore, will account for causal relations. Following this line of reasoning, an adequate
explanation of mind should describe the mind not in terms of reducibly physical component parts,
but rather account for a nexus between mind and body.
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and the spontaneous emergence of mind from brain seems to suggest an initial point
of which there is no cause. Logically a causeless initial cause is inconsistent and
difficult to accept. 71 This theory creates a situation of which the mind can still be
understood as some definable, determinable, physically observable phenomenon,
giving it the illusion of subsistence and providing a haven for its existence to reside
in. In other words, the theory allows for top‐down causality without top‐down
causes, allows for mind‐to‐brain causality without granting mental causes.72
Such problems arise in part due to attachment to the notion of permanent
selfhood pervading western thinking. Western philosophy too often conflates the
terms mind and self. For example, any given book on philosophy of mind will devote
some time to the notion of free will. The relevance of free will to mind lies in the
idea that the mind holds the autonomy and independence of the self. While
previously the predominant view was that selfhood persisted in such forms as a
soul, as religious thought became less relevant after the European enlightenment,
selfhood was relocated to the mental realm, which to many was reducibly physical.
The impermanence of the body was granted, however the permanence or inherent
existence of some attributes constituting the self was assumed nonetheless.
71 At the third Mind and Life conference, the Dalai Lama and western scientists touched on this
subject of categorizing the mind as an emergent property of the brain. The Dalai Lama commented:
“There are many degrees of subtlety of consciousness, and science has looked only at the ordinary
levels. So, science has merely not found the more subtle ones…and merely not finding is not enough
to controvert…because of the human body, there is a certain consciousness that entirely depends on
the human organism. Obviously, we call that grosser level of mind the human mind. In that sense, you
could virtually speak of the human mind as being an emergent property of the body.” However, in
regards to subtler levels of consciousness, the substantial cause for the mental must be mental. See
Goleman (1997), 227‐228.

For a discussion regarding philosophical issues raised in interpreting top‐down causality in
terms of interlevel causation, rather than intralevel causation, see Carl F. Craver and William Bechtel,
“Top‐Down Causality without Top‐Down Causes,” in Biology and Philosophy (2007) 22:547‐563.
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This assumption has led western philosophers of mind to focus on explaining
what permanent attributes could account for selfhood and often ignoring the
possibility that there is no self.73 Even the “emergent mind” hypothesis, which
attempts at dismissing a mind that is categorically distinct from the brain reflects
such problems. If there were no self to consider along with no mind to deny, there
would be no need to establish the mind as existentially dependent on, but causally
distinct from the changing, neuroplastic brain. As research on neuroplasticity
revealed the brain is rather dynamic, it could no longer serve as the seat of selfhood.
Selfhood, then must reside in the mental realm, existing by way of memory or some
other continuity. In order to make such notions of selfhood consistent with
physicalist or naturalistic philosophies, the mental came to be regarded as an
emergent property of the brain. In this way, the mental realm is granted some
independence, but not granted categorical distinction from the brain, allowing
selfhood to persist outside of the impermanent, transient body while simultaneously
maintaining a mind that is reducibly physical. The simpler explanation to account
for mind‐brain causality would be to conclude the mind is subject to causes,
conditions, and change and is no more stable or enduring than the brain, both lack
permanence and exist only in dependence on particular causal networks, although
they are distinct. Neuroscientific findings regarding neuroplasticity clearly indicate
the impermanence of brain structure and mental states. The implicit objection to

For example, see Robert R. Llinas, I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self (Cambridge: MIT Press,
2002), which examines selfhood from the perspective of cellular physiology.
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such a model of mind is if the mind, like the brain, is impermanent, what is left to
identify the self with? 74
The Self
Neuroplasticity reveals that human beings are not some fixed, monolithic entity,
rather both the mental and the physical aspects of the individual are plastic and are
even characterized by impermanent and varying processes. Knowing that change is
the nature of our being, the question of self has never been greater.75 If both mind
and body are constantly changing and therefore lack permanent attributes, what
accounts for selfhood? From the Buddhist perspective, perhaps the most significant
implications of neuroplasticity are those regarding conceptions of the self.
According to Buddhism, just as the mind is subject to particular causes and
conditions, undergoing constant change and therefore impermanent and lacking
inherent existence, so too for the self. When Buddhists assert that there is no self,
what is being suggested is that there is no permanent entity of which to identify
with the self and the experience of self as a enduring being is an illusion. Rather, the
74 Some scientists in the field of biology and cognitive science are aware of the problem of self when
thinking of the mind as an emergent property of the brain. For example, neuroscientist Francisco
Varela notes that the Buddhist notion of no‐self or empty self follows the model of “virtual self” being
developed in his field. Following this view, the self can be seen as the emergent property of the mind,
but like the mind, the self has no inherent existence and is something like an optical illusion of the
mind. Individuals reify the self and attribute permanence and solidity to something that is illusory.
However, even this notion of virtual self seems to maintain attachment to the notion of a permanent
self, despite the implications of such a theory. While it is noted that the self cannot be located
anywhere in the body, the self is described as “produced by an underlying network of biological and
cognitive systems.” However, following the logical conclusion of “virtual self” there should be nothing
that could be identified as “produced,” except perhaps when speaking of the conventional experience
of self, but that is not how it is used. See Daniel Goleman, ed., Destructive Emotions: A Scientific
Dialogue with the Dalai Lama (New York: Bantam, 2004), 93.

Naturally, many thinkers have explored the question of self. For a contemporary and influential
work, see Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett, The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self &
Soul (New York: Basic Books, 2001), which contains Dennett’s well‐known essay, “Where Am I?”.
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self is designated as a transiently existent phenomenon, meaning the self is both
existent and illusory.
No‐self can be examined as follows. When thinking of ‘I,’ there arises a
conception of something independent of the body, mind, or a continuum of such
elements, as if these things were irrelevant to and separate from ‘I.’ Then one may
question if this ‘I’ is one with the elements or different from them. Buddhists
understand mental and physical aggregates as having different types and sources,
lacking the unity of ‘I.’ Because these aggregates are of many kinds, there would be
many types of ‘I’ if the self could be equated to these elements. Furthermore, if these
aggregates were eliminated or destroyed, ‘I’ would be also. It is impossible,
therefore, that ‘I’ and the aggregates could be one in the same.
However, if the ‘I’ and the aggregates were completely independent of each
other, they could not relate to each other. Then, when the body is sick, it would
mean the ‘I’ is not sick, when the body suffers, ‘I’ do not suffer, but this is not
supported by experience. Therefore, the self and mental and physical aggregates
cannot be unrelated.
Yet, for the self to have existence it must have subsistence (something that
categorizes it as existent and as existentially distinct from other existent entities)
and what characterizes it should either be the same or different from the aggregates.
Because neither one is the case, one must conclude that there is nothing inherently
existent to the ‘I.’ The ‘I’ does not exist, but this is also counter to experience, so one
must conclude that it is not totally non‐existent. Conventionally, there is a self, but it
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is a nominal ‘I’ of imputed existence. 76 The self is not inherently existent, it is not
totally non‐existent, it is not both of these, and it is not either of these.77 The self
must be understood both on the conventional and ultimate levels. As mentioned, a
fundamental Buddhist philosophical belief is the ‘two truths:’ the two levels of
reality. As the Dalai Lama states:
One level is the empirical, phenomenal and relative
level that appears to us, where functions such as causes
and conditions, names and labels, and so on can be
validly understood. The other is a deeper level of
existence beyond that, which Buddhist philosophers
describe as the fundamental, or ultimate, nature of
reality, and which is often technically referred to as
‘emptiness.’78
So while the self does not exist at the ultimate level, it can continue to be validly
understood in terms of the relative level of ordinary experience.
A major objection to such a view is if the ‘I’ has imputed existence, who is
doing the imputing? In other words, there must be self to establish self. However,
this objection assumes a nihilistic interpretation of the Buddhist view and is not in
agreement with what is being suggested. Buddhists are denying the inherent

The logic used in analyzing the self is extrapolated from the Dalai Lama’s presentation of the
argument. See H. H. the Dalai Lama, The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the Middle Way (Delhi: Vikas
Publishing House, 1975), 42‐45.
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In the discussion on the nature of self, the Dalai Lama quotes Nagarjuna here, from the
Fundamental Text Called ‘Wisdom’ (XV.10): “‘Existence’ is holding to permanence, ‘Non‐existence’ is a
view of nihilism. Not existent, not non‐existent, not both and not something that is not both.” Quoted
in ibid., 44.
77

78 See Dalai Lama, Herbert Benson, Robert A. F. Thurman, Daniel Goleman, and Howard Gardner, et
al., MindScience: An EastWest Dialogue, proceedings of the symposium sponsored by the Mind/Body
Medical Institute of Harvard Medical School & New England Deaconess Hospital, and Tibet House
New York, edited by Daniel Goleman and Robert A. F. Thurman (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991),
14.
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existence of self as a phenomenon independent of other phenomena. Thus, inherent
existence is the object of negation. The idea that the self is completely non‐existent
is not the Buddhist view. Rather, the self is a dependently originated phenomenon
and is constantly undergoing change, however as a result of conditioning,
phenomena appear to inherently exist. Attachment to the idea of permanence
invariably leads to dissatisfaction, or suffering as noted in the Four Noble Truths.
From the Buddhist perspective, all mental afflictions arise from misunderstanding
the nature of things, namely the nature of self.79
The MindBody Problem
While dependent origination, discussed earlier, explains the ontological status of
mind and matter and confirms both as subject to change and therefore without
inherent existence, the theory does not explain how the physical and mental
interact. Known as the mind‐body problem in western philosophy of mind, the
question is how can something nonphysical (the mind) act on the physical (the
body)? What is the mechanism? According to Buddhism, the causal networks of
mind and body are intertwined, yet they are not identical, nor are they subject to all
the same laws, as mental states independence from physical sensory information

79 For an interesting comparison between Buddhism and science regarding afflictions relating to
identity, see William S. Waldron, “Common Ground, Common Cause: Buddhism and Science on the
Afflictions of Identity,” in Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground, edited by Alan Wallace (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 145‐191.
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illustrates.80 Therefore, when the physical and mental realms interact, the
occurrences are within a particular causal network.
When the nose as physical sensory organ comes in contact with the scent of a
flower, there occurs a mental correlate to physical occurrence. That mental
correlate or sensation is mediated by perception and translated into the realm of
subjectivity as a concept. The phenomenon goes from a transition to physical (for
example, a rose), then exists as both physical and mental phenomena (smelling the
rose), then enjoys independence within the mental realm (smell of the rose). The
Abidharma kosa sastra (Abhidhamma in Pali), one of the three parts of the Pali canon
known as the Tripitaka (Pali: Tipitaka), regards consciousness as acting without an
actor, but not without cause, and conscious cognition is therefore understood in
terms of the dynamics of input and output.81 The input data are the objects of
consciousness. When the objects of consciousness arise from the physical senses
they are known as rupa, translated as body or matter. Other input comes from
consciousness itself, independent from the physical senses, called nama, translated
as mind. According to the Abidharma, the mind is regarded as the sixth sense, as

That is not to say there are no laws. One important Buddhist thinker who explored psychological
laws was Dharmakirti (ca. 7th cent.).
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The Abidharma is a compilation of canonical Theravada Buddhist texts and one of three sets of
volumes known collectively as the Tipitaka or “Three Baskets.” The texts are in Pali, compiled around
500 B.C.E. to 250 B.C.E. and deal with phenomenological psychology as obtained through the effects
of meditation or trained introspection. See Henk Barendregt, “The Abhidhamma Model of
Consciousness and Its Consequences,” in Horizons in Buddhist Psychology, (Taos Institute
Publications: Chagrin Falls, 2006), 331‐349 for a sketch of the Abidharma model and an
interpretation of that model regarding various psychological notions like neurosis, psychosis, and
coping mechanisms. The effects of mindfulness meditation are considered in light of
psychotherapeutic explanations. Not all volumes of the Abidharma have been translated into English,
including five volumes of the Patthana.
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noted earlier when discussing the typology of mental phenomena. Yet, this does not
refer to anything supernatural as ‘sixth sense’ implies in the West, but refers to the
ability of consciousness to supply its own input. When rupa is the object, it is
immediately copied to consciousness with a corresponding nama, as in the above
example of smelling the rose.82 Nama then becomes output in terms of mental states
and body movements and speech.83
Some suggest the Abidharma is not solving the mind‐body problem, nor even
addressing it.84 However, that is because in Buddhist philosophy there is no mind‐
body problem. The question ‘how can the mind act on the body?’ would only have
relevance if the mind where completely independent from the physical world,
because then there would be no causal networks between the two to account for
interaction. However, since the mind does in fact affect and influence the body, as
the body does the mind, they are necessarily related and must be subject to some of
the same causes and conditions. As stated earlier, Buddhism does not assume
duality between mind and body, rather they give rise to the origination of each other
and therefore must share some of the same causal networks. Two‐way causation is
the logical product of such conditioned phenomena. It is exactly because the mind
and body are conditioned phenomena that the mind is able to act on the body and

Part of rupa does not come from the physical sense, but from the mind. Organizing information
into composite parts is an example. Another example is the immediate judgments of visible objects
being edible or having sexual quality. See ibid., 332.
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the body on the mind. If they existed completely independently of each other,
causality would be an impossibility.
Understandably, this explanation would seem somewhat insufficient for
those in the field of science. The main component that seems to be missing is that
mind cannot be localized in spatio‐temporal terms. In other words, how is one to
objectively identify something that exists outside the laws of the physical world,
how could it possibly be accounted for? While the answers to such questions will be
explored more fully in the conclusion, it seems appropriate here to address the
relationship between the mental world and physical reality. Empiricism is based on
observation and experience in the hopes of identifying an objective world
independent of mental subjectivity. However, empiricism, and the validity of
objective accounts, is based on the fundamental assumption that reality exists as we
experience it, or at least that there is some correlation between the two. If there
were none, all sensory evidence would be irrelevant. Yet, the empirical tool used for
science is after all the mind and if scientists do not understand how the mind is
related to physical reality, how can they ever expect empirical adequacy?85 As
mentioned, Buddhists regard the mental as one of the fundamental aspects of
reality. The following thought experiment will hopefully elucidate why and illustrate
where and how mentality resides in reality.

B. Alan Wallace comments, “The primary instrument that all scientists have used to make every
type of observation is the human mind […] This is tantamount to using an instrument for three
hundred years before subjecting it to scientific scrutiny.” See Wallace and Hodel, 56.
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A classic thought experiment asks, “If a tree were to fall in the forest and no
one were around to hear it, would it make a sound?” If sound is understood as the
physical waves that occur, then yes, the tree makes a sound. However, if sound is
understood in terms of vibrations within the ear resulting in hearing, then no, sound
did not occur. Yet, assume that the world is made up of all deaf beings. If scientists of
sound were to confine their research to sound waves alone, without any reports of a
hearing experience, they would not understand much about sound. Indeed, they
would have no reason based on sound waves alone to conclude they are correlated
to hearing at all. Now, remove all reference to sensory information. In this universe,
there is little reason to determine anything regarding correlations between the
mental realm and the physical world. Rather, this universe is silent, dark, and empty.
Furthermore, it would be completely meaningless to ask questions about this
abysmal world beyond our observations.86
There can be no knowledge without knowing and no knowing without
luminosity. The mind is what casts the light on this universe resulting in the
explosion of sensations, perceptions, and conceptions. It is nothing other than this
illumination and knowing. When we try to find the mind, we need only look at the
brilliance of reality surrounding us. Without mind, matter would be impenetrably
dark, and without matter, mind would be blinding light. Between the two arises the
world of conditioned things and quite literally, reality as we experience it.
Reality as We Experience It: Perception
For a fascinating and controversial thesis on the emergence of consciousness, see Julian Jaynes,
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Mariner Books, 2000).
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According to Buddhist epistemology, our ability to ascertain objects has inherent
limitations. One limitation is temporal, in that the ordinary untrained mind can only
ascertain an event that occurs over a certain period of time, traditionally thought to
be about a span of a finger snap. While one may perceive the event, it is not subject
to conscious recollection.87 The second limitation on human ascertainment is the
inclination to regard objects or events according to their composite nature. For
example, if I were to look at a coffee mug, I would not see the individual molecules
or the space between them, rather I would see the composite object that is made‐up
of such. Moments are similarly conflated into one continuum, when in fact any given
moment is composed of numberless temporal sequences.88
How perceptions arise is a major point of interest in Indian and Tibetan
Buddhist epistemology and continues to be debated. There are three main schools of
thought. One suggests that when looking at a multicolored object, for example, there
is a multiplicity of perceptions that occur with the visual experience. Accordingly,
any given perception is made up of endless amounts of minute perceptions. A
second school upholds the view that perception and the object perceived are
identical and the event is split into objective and subjective halves. The third
position is that traditionally accepted in Tibetan schools, and argues despite the
myriad facets of a chosen object, perceptual experience occurs as a single unitary
Buddhist epistemology distinguishes between ascertainment and perception, with the former
referring to ‘wholly registering the object/event,’ subject to recollection. Perceptions are a
component of ascertainment, however the nature of perception is much more complicated and will
be discussed below.
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88 See Dalai Lama (2005), 172. His Holiness explains the nature of temporal conflation by using the
example of perceiving a movie as one fluid motion even though it is in fact made up of a series of
individual pictures.
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event.89 How we experience reality is not in fact mirroring ‘what is out there,’ but is
a complex process of organization that makes potentially infinite amounts of
information manageable to the human mind.
Another long‐standing question in Western philosophy of mind is how can
experience be accounted for? How can neurons give rise to experience, how can
neurons be about something? These questions arise due to the need for a theory of
cognitive representation consistent with a physicalist or naturalist ontology. Yet,
according to the traditional interpretation of Tibetan schools, because the nature of
perception prevents the mind from mirroring reality, this view does not need to
answer the question how neurons can be about something, that something is the
perception, not a reality or entity. Perceptual experience cannot be equated to
reality, although they are correlated. Even though perception cannot reflect ultimate
reality under ordinary circumstances, it maintains conventional truth. For all
practical purposes, ascertaining ultimate reality is irrelevant for determining the
truth of conventional experience and conventional reality is reality as we experience
it. So, while perception does not reflect ultimate reality, it retains truth‐value in
understanding our world of convention.90
Consciousness, Neurophysiology, and MindBody Causation
Neuroscientific research regarding meditation has shown mental practice and the
development of certain mental states is conducive to neuroplasticity. The
89

Ibid., 172‐3.

Another point of interest in Buddhist epistemology is the analysis of true and false perceptions.
See ibid., 173.
90

48

implications of such research from the Buddhist perspective, provides evidence for
the transformative nature of mind, the existential distinction between mind and
body, the ability of the mental and physical to influence each other, and as evidence
for the distinction between perception and reality. Buddhist phenomenology of
mind may also provide a means of which to understand top‐down causation in
terms of the associated neurophysiological happenings. A further examination of the
Abidharma model of consciousness may provide a theoretical explanation of why
some meditation‐based therapy is successful.
The Abidharma suggests consciousness is not continuous; rather
consciousness is made up of minute sequences called cetas. A ceta has three phases
of arising, existing, and disappearing, all in a short duration of time. Each ceta is
directed toward some object of cognition and will determine proceeding cetas,
known as the karmic (Pali: kammic) effect of the ceta. There are many different
types of cetas that could be associated with any given object. For example, a visual
object may incite greed, lust, or compassion. Both the type and the object of the ceta
influence future cetas. Such influence results in accumulated karma, which is
transferred and augmented to proceeding cetas. Accumulated karma, can influence
present cetas or future cetas in a number of ways. When a ceta has a direct effect on
the following ceta it is known as producing karma. Producing karma is subdivided
into unwholesome, leading to attachment and suffering, and wholesome karma,
giving rise to freedom and decreased suffering. When collaborated with other cetas
to produce an effect it is known as supporting karma. When the karma force of a ceta
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or cetas resist the effects of other cetas it is called obstructing karma. Some effects of
cetas can be wholly prevented by other cetas, called destructive karma.
Cetas are composed of what are known as cetasikas, meaning “born together
with a ceta,” and can be thought of as mental “elementary particles.”91 Cetasikas
occur simultaneously with cetas and share the same object. Most cetas are
determined by their cetasikas of which there are three main groups: unwholesome,
neutral, and beautiful. Cetasikas are also distinguished according to temporality,
either universal or occasional. According to the Tibetan view, there are five factors
universal to all mental events: feeling (value judgment, emotion), recognition
(rudimentary distinctions, perception), engagement (volition, motivation), attention
(choosing input), and contact (obtaining input) with the object.92 There can be
additional factors. Mental factors are not considered separate entities, but rather as
different aspects or processes of the same mental event, distinguished by their
functions.93 Vithis consist of a serial collaboration of cetas and have to do with
cognitive‐emotional processing.
In “The Abhidhamma Model of Consciousness,” Henk Barendregt shows how
the Abidharma model is possibly implemented in the brain in terms of current
neurophysiological understanding. Barendregt states, “It is well‐known from
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See Barendregt, 335.

The Abidharma posits seven universal neutral cetasikas: contact (obtaining input), feeling (value
judgment), volition (motivation), perception (rudimentary distinctions), attention (choosing input),
cooperation (synchronization), and one‐pointedness (focus). Ibid., 336. For the Tibetan system, see
Dalai Lama (2005), 176. There are many systems of enumeration, however the standard version
traditionally upheld by Tibetan thinkers follows that of the fourth‐century thinker Asanga.
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neuropsychological experiments that consciousness has parallel and serial aspects,”
and that is exactly what the Abidharma model emphasizes.94 Cetas show
consciousness has a strong serial component and collaborating cetasikas suggest
parallel processing. Serial discrete series of cetas perhaps occur as the firing of one
group of neurons, as this firing indeed happens in discrete units. Also, just as the
ceta has three phases of arising, existing, and ceasing, the action potential for each
neuron clearly exhibits such a life cycle. Furthermore, the four types of karma
(producing, supporting, obstructing, and destroying) are consistent with the well
established collaborating, excitatory, and inhibitory types of neurons. Finally,
accumulated karma may occur as new synapses between neurons.
As Barendregt discusses, the Abidharma can provide insight into the nature
of such mental afflictions as neuroses, psychoses, and other pathologies such as
depression. For example, Freud discusses neuroses in terms of conflict between the
superego, at the level of cognition, and the id’s underlying drives. The Abidharma
explains how this occurs. All cetas contain a cetasika of feeling, however vithis, as a
chain of cetas, constitute cognitive‐emotional processing. Emotions/feelings
associated with particular cetas can and often do conflict with thoughts in the vithis.
The Abidharma model shows the organization of consciousness in terms of not only
the cognitive level of our mind, but the neurotic core as well. As Barendregt notes,
psychotherapists often work at the cognitive level of mind and attempt at modifying
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one’s thinking (i.e. one’s vithis). However, working directly with the cetas and
cetasikas may be a powerful treatment as well.95
The Abidharma model illustrates how consciousness might occur at the
neurophysiological level. Such modeling suggests a theoretical explanation as to
why some meditation therapy has been successful, evidenced by the Mindfulness
Based Stress Reduction treatment developed by Kabat‐Zinn and Mindfulness Based
Cognitive Therapy developed by Segal discussed earlier. What the Abidharma model
of consciousness illustrates is how such top‐down causation may possibly occur.
Purification of mental afflictions through mindfulness involves the prevention of
unwholesome cetas, resulting in no new accumulation of negative karma. There is a
coherent physiological explanation for the experience of advanced meditators: with
the reduction of the firing of neurons associated with mental afflictions, the brain
circuitry falls into disuse, while the networks responsible for positive emotions
become ever stronger.96 This notion is consistent with the seventh‐century
philosopher and monk Dharmakirti’s psychological law of impermanence regarding
the transformability of consciousness. The law posits one mental state cannot be
developed without undermining the integrity of opposing mental states. This means,
for example, that the cultivation of compassion will necessarily result in the
diminishment of hate and ethnocentrism.97 Neuroplasticity has shown that changes
in the mind and brain are possible, neurophysiology provides a means of physical
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argument was put forth at the twelfth Mind and Life conference. See Begley, 242.

See Dalai Lama (2005), 147.
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manifestation, and the Abidharma notion of consciousness provides a theoretical
model for the transformation of associated mental and physical states.
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4
CONCLUSION
Neuroplasticity is the means by which meditation can bring about enduring
physical, mental, and emotional changes. Scientists now know that the brain
undergoes constant change, even through adulthood, and that understanding and
controlling neuroplasticity is vital for adapting to changing conditions, learning new
things, and developing new skills. Neuroscientist Michael Merzenich at the
University of California, San Francisco believes that in the future, our understanding
of neuroplasticity will bring in an age of “brain‐fitness” based on the notion that just
as one needs to exercise the body, the brain needs to be worked as well to promote
health and well‐being and Buddhists could not agree more.98 Yet, before this can be
realized, some advances in the scientific study of mind are needed.
Scientific Study of the Mind
Although the mind permeates our experiences, science generally excludes the
subjective from the natural world and attributes causality only to physical, objective
phenomena. This is because empiricism and scientific materialism are often
conflated, resulting in the dogma within the scientific field that the individual,
private, and subjective are not part of the metaphysical composition of the cosmos.
The assumption is that the objective world somehow lies beyond the subjective
realm including all our sensory and mental information, which is not granted the
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same status of ‘existence’ as the physical, but rather consigned the status of
epiphenomenon or illusion.
Scientists furthermore put great emphasis on reductionism, analyzing reality
according to its constituent parts. Although reductionism has served the scientific
tradition well, it is not always the appropriate approach. Just as examining
phenomena at the subatomic level will not reveal the global processes occurring in
diverse regions of the brain, so a solely objective account of the brain cannot
account for subjective mental events or any mind‐brain correlates. Such an objective
reductionist account by itself cannot reveal any type of evidence for the existence of
consciousness or subjective experience at all, just as sound waves alone cannot
explain the experience of hearing as noted earlier. Neural events could not even
have meaning outside of first‐person accounts of mind. Such a commitment to
ontological reductionism undermines the fundamental ideal of consilience found in
the sciences. Once free from the dogmas of materialism and reductionism, scientific
inquiry of consciousness can be greatly strengthened by Buddhist thought and that
of other contemplative traditions.99
Buddhism, like science, presents itself as a body of systematic knowledge
about the natural world and posits a range of testable hypothesis and theories
regarding the nature of mind and its relationship to the physical environment. These
theories have been tested and experientially confirmed numerous times over the

B. Alan Wallace makes such an argument in “Introduction: Buddhism and Science—Breaking
Down the Barriers.” See Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground, edited by B. Alan Wallace
(Columbia University Press: New York, 2003), 1‐29.
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past twenty‐five hundred years, by way of duplicable meditative techniques.
Although scientific knowledge is collective and public and contemplative insights
are private, not being demonstrable is not equivalent to being unobservable. Any
competent researcher with sufficient training can replicate the results.
Yet, the mind is a unique case of inquiry, in that the object of study is mental,
the instrument of study is mental, and the medium by which the study is undertaken
is mental. The research instruments of science are designed to measure physical
phenomena and therefore contemporary neuroscience involves analysis of such
physical measurements. Buddhist contemplatives reject this methodology out of
hand. A brief digression will illustrate the point. At the Dalai Lama’s urging several
Tibetan contemplatives residing in the hills of Dharamsala agreed to meet with a
group of western scientists to study the effects of mental training. Each monk, after
being briefed on the project and the intended research, made similar comments
regarding the scientists’ proposed methodology: ‘if you want to understand the
mind, you should examine the mind.’ Often the encounters turned into long debates
regarding the validity of scientific analysis for the study consciousness. In the end,
resistance to scientific analysis was so severe that no usable data was gained from
the scientists’ time spent in Dharamsala.100
Such complications arise due to Buddhist understanding of mentality,
characterized by its subjective nature. All of subjective experience has two
components, the physical components such as brain chemistry and behavior of an
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See Begley, 215‐219.
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individual and the phenomenological experience of the mental events themselves,
including cognitive, emotional, and psychological states. In order for the scientific
study of mind to be complete, a paradigm shift in methodology is needed to account
for not only the neurological and other biological happenings, but also the subjective
experience itself. In order to accomplish such a task, use of both the third‐person
and the first‐person approach is necessary. As the Dalai Lama notes, it is for the
phenomenology of mind that the application of a first‐person method is essential.101
First‐person methodology is vital in advancing understanding of the qualia of
consciousness, something science has yet to address sufficiently. No objective
account of neurons and brain functions can convey the subjective experience itself.
Modern Buddhists urge scientists to utilize the first‐person investigative analysis of
the nature and functions of the mind, by training the mind to focus on its own
internal states. Referred to as gom in Tibetan, this mental training carries the
connotation of familiarization and implies rigorous, focused and disciplined use of
introspection, mindfulness, and insight to make empirical observations. This is
perhaps the most scientific aspect of Buddhism. As the Dalai Lama has argued, and I

Ibid., 145. Some philosophers of science have argued for the third‐person approach as well. For
example, see Gualtiero Piccinini, “Data from Introspective Reports: Upgrading from Commonsense to
Science,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.9‐10 (2003), 141‐156. Piccinini argues scientists can and
should analyze introspective reports and provides a methodology based on public evidence and
assumptions in assessing the validity of third‐person accounts. Also see, Alvin Goldman,
“Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports: Trust, Warrant, and Evidential
Sources,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 11.7‐8 (2004), 1‐16, for similar views. Ludwig
Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, put forth a famous objection called the “beetle in the
box” that argues the mind is treated as an entity, however that entity is unobservable and therefore
any conclusions of commonality between minds is grounded on the belief in something we cannot be
certain exists. Wittgenstein’s beetle has been applied to a variety of philosophical investigations. See
David G. Stem, “The Uses of Wittgenstein’s Beetle: Philosophical Investigations [section] 293 and its
Interpreters,” in Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker, edited by Guy
Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 248‐268.
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agree, “the combination of the first‐person method with the third‐person method
offers the promise of real advance in the scientific study of consciousness.”102
Science and the Ethical Goals of Buddhism
Ethics is fundamental to Buddhist philosophy; anything with philosophical
implications also has ethical implications.103 Compassion, the primary ethic of
Mahayana, is understood as built into the Four Noble Truths, were a wish to be free
of suffering is extended to include all sentient beings. However, freedom from
suffering cannot be bestowed, it is accomplished only by internalizing the truth. The
goal of the Mahayana Buddhist practitioner then, is to first know and embody the
truth oneself and then teach it to others.104
Buddhism has established five fields of knowledge in regards to caring for
others: medicine, technology, logic, the science of sound, and inner
knowledge/spiritual practice.105 In this ethical context, science becomes a mode of
disseminating knowledge on appropriate practice, revealing the truth and efficacy of
Buddhist teaching. One of the broader goals outlined in such organizations as the
Mind and Life Institute is the collaboration between Buddhists and scientists in
alleviating suffering and increasing the overall well being of humankind, illustrating
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The Dalai Lama (2005), 142.

103 Ethics is considered to be the basis of all other practice and the support for attaining wisdom
and therefore, ethical conduct is primary. See Dalai Lama (1975), 45.

Ibid., 46‐47. Buddha said the only way beings can be free is through the truth of the nature of
things. The Dalai Lama goes on to explain how the goal of the Buddhist is to spread the teachings,
arguing people need to be taught what should be adopted and what should be discarded in practice.
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See Goleman (1997), 245.
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the role of science as an ally in following the Buddhist ethic. 106 Science actually has
little to no affect on Tibetan nationals’ practice and belief, but this was never its
intended role in Buddhism.107 Rather, science is a teaching aid in the modern
context and can be completely separate from the achievement of wisdom and the
practice of the Buddhist tradition at large, even for modern Buddhists.108
Just as with any philosophical topics within Buddhism, neuroplasticity is
interpreted in part according to its ethical implications. Neuroplasticity has called
into question what critics call neurogenetic determinism, the belief, propelled by
modern genetics and pharmacology, that genes and chemical composition are the
ultimate and inescapable determinants of behavior and mental health.109 This view
is not argued for exactly, rather it is implicit in medical research aimed at identifying
genes that account for various pathologies and the pharmacological attempts to find
medicinal cures for psychological and behavioral disorders. Determinism often
produces a nihilistic attitude towards personal responsibility, as one cannot be
accountable for his/her natural composition, making ethics irrelevant. However,
neuroplasticity reveals the power of mind over matter, making individual moral
responsibility relevant once again in the modern and scientific West. Sharon Begley,
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The Dalai Lama reiterates these goals at every Mind and Life conference.

107 The Dalai Lama introduced scientific discourse as part of the monastic curriculum and today,
more and more Buddhist students from monastic universities engage in some systematic study of
science. Nonetheless, Tibetan nationals lack the same engagement with science that is occurring in
the West. See Begley, 23 and 50.

The Dalai Lama’s repeated description of science as “ammo” for spreading the Dharma
illustrates how science is used as a tool for grander Buddhist goals. For example, see Goleman
(1997), 248, “You scientists are giving me more ammunition now!”
108
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Newsweek science writer and author of Train Your Mind Change Your Brain,
following the proceedings of the twelfth Mind and Life conference, states, “Perhaps
one of the most provocative implications of neuroplasticity and the power of mental
training to alter the circuits of the brain is that it undermines neurogentic
determinism.”110 Rather than a deterministic scenario, this study has revealed a
dynamic one, in terms of the nature of mind and body and ethical orientation. From
the Buddhist perspective, neuroplasticity vindicates the role of ethics.
In the realm of philosophy, the relationship between Buddhism and Science
becomes quite a bit more complex. Where fact ends and theory begins we see a
different kind of relationship emerge between the two, not of ethical allies, but
philosophical competitors, vying for interpretative superiority. The emergence of a
Buddhist theory of neuroplasticity illustrates the creative tension between the two
traditions. This process is not antagonistic, but constructive and reveals a lot about
the relationship between Buddhism and Science and the potential for future growth.
Neuroplasticity is an area of study that has and continues to produce
particularly meaningful exchange with Buddhism. The interpretation and analysis of
neuroplasticity from the Buddhist perspective serves as a contribution to western
philosophy of science, answering many open questions about the mind and the
mind‐body relationship. Furthermore, the Buddhist interpretation illustrates the
wide applicability of Buddhist ideas to modern western ones; neuroplasticity is just
one area of study within the realm of Buddhism and Science, yet the implications
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Ibid., 253.
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and applications are numerous and of vital importance. What this study hopefully
elucidates is the validity and value of continuing dialogue and including Buddhist
philosophy in western philosophy of science discourse. I do not think it is an
exaggeration to state the mind is the scientific question of the twenty‐first century,
yet contemporary western philosophy cannot adequately explain neuroplasticity
and mind‐body causality. Buddhism can. The nature of our being is change,
harnessing that change becomes cultivation, and cultivation induces transformation.
Imagine a world of mental fitness, nurturing the skills of happiness and compassion
and decreasing suffering and hate, an era of limitless human potential.
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